Michigan Law Review
Volume 66

Issue 1

1967

Evidence--Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct Evidence in
Wisconsin--Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co.
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Courts Commons, Evidence Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the State
and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Evidence--Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct Evidence in
Wisconsin--Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 66 MICH. L. REV. 183 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EVIDENCE-Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct
Evidence in Wisconsin-Lewandowski v.
Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co.*
Defendant's attorney in a personal injury action sought on crossexamination to impeach plaintiff's physician regarding his determination of the degree of plaintiff's disability by referring to the
medical standards set forth in the American Medical Association's
Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment-The Extremities and Back. 1 Pointing to the physician's testimony that he had
not relied on the Guide in making his evaluation, the trial court
sustained plaintiff's objection that such cross-examination was not
permissible. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection in accordance
with the established rule that it is not permissible to cross-examine
with respect to a medical treatise on which the witness did not
specifically rely in giving his direct testimony. 2 However, the court
ruled prospectively that such cross-examination would be permitted,
and, in addition, that medical treatises recognized by the medical
profession as authoritative could be admitted as independent evidence "to prove the truth of a matter stated therein."
In announcing its new rule, Wisconsin joined Alabama as apparently the only states which, in the absence of expr~ !.tatutory
authority, permit the introduction of medical treatises as ~rmative
substantive evidence.3 With the exception of states which deal with
1

• 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966) (hereinafter cited as principal case; page
cites are to the regional reporter].
1. J.A.M.A. (special edition Feb. 15, 1958) [hereinafter referred to as the Guide].
The Guide consists of disability percentage tables based on objectively determined
measurements of restriction of motion.
Plaintiff suffered a rupture of two cervical discs, requiring ankylosis or surgical
fusion of the two spinal vertebrae. Plaintiff's physician testified that the resulting
disability involved 20% of the spine and 10% of the body, whereas defendant's witness
estimated disability at 10 and 5% respectively. The Guide, however, sets only 3 to 7%
spinal impairment and 2 to 4% bodily impairment as the result of ankylosis of any
two cervical vertebrae. Guide 89, 103.
2. Prior to the principal case, the "Wisconsin rule was that medical texts were
inadmissible as independent direct evidence and, for purposes of cross-examination,
could be used only to test the qualifications of a medical witness or to impeach a
witness who had based llis opinion on that particular treatise. Zoldoske v. State, 82
Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892); City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614 (1872). See note
8 infra.
3. Alabama first enunciated its rule that "medical authors, whose books are admitted or proven to be standard works with that profession, ought to be received in.
evidence" in Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558, 567 (1857) (treatise on venereal
disease admitted to dispute local expert's testimony that the disease could be transmitted by ordinary personal contact). Over eighty years later, the same court said
"(w]e have not found the ends of justice defeated by our rule, nor the difficulties of
its application very great." City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 607, 188 S. 264,
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the matter in statutory provisions,4 the remaining jurisdictions,
state and federal, follow the rule that medical treatises, being "hearsay,"5 are not admissible as direct evidence "to prove the truth of
the matter stated therein." 6 Learned treatises in such fields as mathe266-67 (1939); accord, Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 S.2d 6 (1953). Alabama has since
codified its rule. See note 4 infra. Dean Wigmore, writing in 1940, discerned possible
acceptance of the Alabama rule in Iowa. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1692 (3d ed. 1940);
see Bowman v. ·woods, 1 Iowa 441 (1848). However, although not specifically overruled, the case has not been followed by subsequent Iowa courts. See, e.g., Morton v.
Equitable Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 846, 254 N.W. 325 (1934).
4. Twelve states have statutes which purport to permit treatises as prima fade
or presumptive evidence of "facts of general notoriety and interest" under varying
circumstances. Eight of these statutory provisions are general in scope, e.g., IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1948) ("Historical works, books of science or art, and published
maps or charts, made by persons indifferent between the parties, are prima facie
evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest.'). See also ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 413
(1960); IowA CODE ANN § 622.23 (1950); MONT. REv. CODE § 93-IIOl-8 (1947); NEB.
REV. STAT, § 25-1218 (1943); ORE. REv. STAT. § 41.670 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-6
(1953). Compare CAL. Evm. CODE § 1341 (West 1966) which provides that such treatises
"are not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove facts of general
notoriety and interest." These statutes, owing to the qualifying clause "facts of
general notoriety and interest," have, however, consistently been interpreted by the
courts as not altering the common-law rule in the case of medical treatises. See, e.g.,
Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation N. Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
Another four states have similar statutes, but these statutes are limited by their
terms to certain categories of cases. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 79c (Supp. 1965) (malpractice suits); NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040 (1963) (malpractice suits); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
31, § 700j-801 (1958) (milk pricing hearings); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-142 (1962) (sanity
hearings). Where this type of statute is involved, the courts have been more likely to
permit medical treatises as direct evidence in derogation of the common law rule.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93, 106 N.E.2d 687 (1952). The application of such
statutes, however, has been strictly confined to the cases specified in the statutes. See,
e.g., Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931).
In addition, three jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which
provide that:
A published treatise, or periodical, or pamphlet on a subject of history, science
or art [shall be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule] to prove tl1e truth
of the matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert
in the subject testifies, that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reliable
authority in the subject.
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(31); KANSAS GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-459(cc) (1964); c. z.
CODE § 2962(31) (1963); V. I. CODE tit. 5 § 932(31) (1957); see 9A UNIFORM LAws
ANNOTATED 591, 640 (1965). The Supreme Court of New Jersey, whose case law as
recently as 1956 supported the majority medical treatise rule [Rutlt v. Fenchel, 21 N.J.
171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956)], has adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence almost without
change as rules of court. N.J. SuP. CT. R. § 63(31) (1965).
5. Professor McCormick defines hearsay as "testimony in court or written evidence
of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show
the truth of the matter asserted •..." C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954). Dean
Wigmore characterizes "hearsay" as "extra-judicial testimonial assertions" which cannot be admitted in evidence because the assertion is not made in court where it may
be subjected to various "tests," chiefly cross-examination. 5 J. 1\TIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361
(3d ed. 1940). Under either verbalization, however, the primary rationale for exclusion
is the same-the not insignificant possibility of unreliability.
6. E.g., Piotrowski v. Corey Hosp., Inc., 172 Ohio St. 61, 173 N.E.2d 355 (1961);
Hopkins v. Gromovsky, 198 Va. 389, 94 S.E.2d 190 (1956). See generally C. McCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 296 (1954); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 718 (1964); 3 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 621 (5tlt
ed. 1958); A. MUNDO, THE EXPERT WITNESS 87-107 (1938); 6 J. 'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1691
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matics or chemistry, however, are more likely to be admitted as
direct evidence, the courts drawing a distinction between "exact
sciences" and "inexact sciences," the latter being characterized by
inductive reasoning. 7
In the area of cross-examination most courts have permitted the
use of medical treatises notwithstanding their hearsay nature. Thus,
medical treatises may usually be introduced for the limited purposes
of testing a witness' qualifications or impeaching his credibility, provided that certain preconditions are met. 8 Some states, including
Wisconsin prior to the principal case, hold that before a witness
can be impeached by reference to a treatise he must be shown to
have relied specifically on that particular treatise in giving his
direct testimony.9 Other states relax the requirement and permit
such cross-examination when the witness has relied on any treatise
(lid ed. 1940); Annot., Medical Books or Treatises as Independent Evidence,
65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930), 84 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1962). It has been held, however, that such
treatises may be admitted upon consent of the parties. Goldthwaite v. Sheraton
Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 415 A.2d 362 (1958); cf. Eagleston v. Rowley, 172 F.2d 202
(9th Cir. 1949). There is also some authority for the view that, notwithstanding the
"no direct evidence" rule, counsel or an expert witness may read excerpts from a
treatise to the jury. Most courts would not permit this, however, since it seems apparent that such an exception would amount to an emasculation of the rule. See, e.g.,
Hopkins v. Gramovsky, supra. In Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 146 Conn. 327,
150 A.2d 602 (1959), however, plaintiff's counsel read such excerpts during his closing
argument from a treatise which had been used in both direct and cross-examination of
the medical witnesses. The court ruled such evidence inadmissible since the treatises
themselves had not been admitted as evidence, but went on to state that the treatise
could have been so introduced. Since this position would appear to be the outer
possible limit short of forthrightly adopting the Alabama rule, it is not surprising
that some confusion exists as to the Connecticut position. See Annot., Counsel's Right
in Arguing Civil Case To Read Medical or Other Learned Treatises to the Jury, 72'
A.L.R.2d 931 (1960).
In the federal courts, FED. R. C1v. P. 43(a) provides that evidence admissible under
United States statutes, federal equity rules "heretofore applied in the courts of the
United States," or state rules of evidence shall be admitted, with the "rule which
favors the reception" controlling. There is no provision in federal statute or equity
rules for admitting such treatises, and thus, with the presumed exception of federal
courts sitting in Alabama or one of the Uniform Rules jurisdictions, federal courts
refuse to admit such evidence. E.g., Stottlemire v. Corwood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C.
1963). See generally, Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DICK L. REv.
381 (1963).

7. E.g., United States v. Two Cases of Chloro Naptholeum Disinfectant, 217 F. 477
(D. Md. 1914) (chemistry book); Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 89 N.W.2d 349 (1958)
(actuarial table). See generally, Note, 46 IowA L. REV. 463 (1961); Note, 26 MARQ. L.
REv. 43 (1941); Note, 19 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 353 (1934).
8. As to rules governing the use of treatises in cross-examination, see 2 B. JoNES,
EVIDENCE § 437 (5th ed. 1958); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1700 (3d ed. 1940); Willens,
Cross-Examining the Expert Witness With the Aid of Books, 41 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
192 (1950); Comment, 12 S. CAL. L. REV. 424 (1939); Note, Medical Treatises as Evidence-Helpful but too Strictly Limited, 29 U. CINc. L. REv. 255 (1960); Annot., Use
of Medical or Other Scientific Treatises in Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, 60
A.L.R.2d 77 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Crowley v. Elgin, J. & E.R.R., 1 Ill. App. 2d 481, ll7 N.E.2d 843 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955); Ross v. Foss, 77 S.D. 358, 92 N.W.2d 147 (1958).
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or treatises in general in reaching his conclusion.10 A few states, yet
more liberal, even permit impeachment by treatise on a showing, or
on judicial notice, that the submitted treatise is "authoritative in
its field." 11 The most permissive approach, of course, is that which
is exemplified by the prospective rule announced in the principal
case. This approach results in completely exempting learned treatises
from the proscriptions of the hearsay rule. Such a result may be
justified on the basis of at least two of the rationales lying behind
all exceptions to the hearsay rule: the material contained in the
treatises may be deemed trustworthy and may be othenvise unavailable for exposition at trial. Nevertheless, most courts cling to the
notion that learned treatises, being a form of hearsay evidence, must
be tightly restricted in use.
The courts' traditional wariness toward admitting the writings
of learned medical authorities has, of course, not extended to hearing the same expert testify on the same matters from the witness
stand. The distinction lies primarily in the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the expert who is present in court.12 Confrontation of a witness by the court and jury, it is argued, permits observation of his demeanor and bearing-both being important factors
in weighing the worth of evidence. More crucial, the "test of fire"
in cross-examination, which is the very heart of the adversarial
process, serves to expose weaknesses and clarify the substance of the
testimony. Thus, the expert's credibility and reliability are tested
in the presence, and for the benefit, of the finder of fact. To these
arguments for the general exclusion of all forms of hearsay, including treatises, may be added the feeling that when the person whose
assertion is to be submitted in evidence is not under oath, his
personal trustworthiness is suspect.13
10. The justification often given for this particular use of a treatise was well
stated in the leading case of Reilly v. Pinirns, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949):
It certainly is illogical, if not actually unfair, to permit witnesses to give expert
opinion based on book knowledge and then deprive the party challenging such
evidence of all opportunity to interrogate them about other leading books.
Reilly, which dealt with the admissibility of medical treatises in the context of postal
fraud, permits cross-examination using a treatise if the witness states that he has
relied on any published work. See Note, 24 TuL. L. REv. 358 (1950). This rule is also
followed in numerous state courts. See, e.g., Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d
297 (1963); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964).
11. In Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., Judge Schaefer stated that:
[Iln our opinion expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment
ot justice if cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recognized authorities, expressed in treatises, or periodicals written for professional colleagues. • • •
The author's competence is established if the judge takes judicial notice of it,
or if it is established by a witness expert in the subject.
33 Ill. 2d 326, 336, 211 N.E.2d 253, 259 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
12. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 224 (1954); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed.
1940).
13. Id. Dean Wigmore views the oath as merely an adjunct to the primary protection of cross-examination since a statement made under oath but out of court, e.g., an
affidavit, is "equally obnoxious to the hearsay rule."
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Apart from these considerations, which apply to hearsay evidence
in general, some commentators have urged other, more specific,
rationales in support of the exclusion of affirmative evidence dra·wn
from medical treatises.14 It is pointed out that the language of
scientific journals, and medical journals in particular, is highly
technical and would be difficult for a fact-finder unfamiliar with
such material to understand. In addition, the treatise may be
written imprecisely, and thus be of questionable evidentiary value:
shades and nuances perhaps not important in the medical school
classroom may assume monumental proportions in the courtroom.
Moreover, in such an inductive discipline as medical theory, it is
inevitable that there will be controversy on a fair number of important points, with eminently respectable schools of opinion on
both sides of a question. Thus, the admission of treatises would
simply lead to a "battle of the books," with each side marshalling
impressive-looking lists of publications and authors. Furthermore,
with the constant evolution and re-evaluation of medical theories
and techniques, the mere passage of a few years' time may lead to
modifications or reservations in the author's mind concerning what
he had previously written. Thus, there is the risk that what is
·written in the treatise is not the same as what the author would
testify in court. Finally, it may be noted that "learned treatises"
are almost never substantially based on the author's personal investigation and observation of the facts, but rather are usually a compilation of a compilation-"hearsay upon hearsay." This multiple
hearsay increases the probability of inaccurate and unreliable testimony from a treatise.
Most of the legal textwriters, 15 led by Dean Wigmore and the
drafters of the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 16 have criticized the majority "learned treatise" rule and
Other considerations sometimes urged in support of the hearsay rule generally, such
as the possibility that the out-of-court assertion may be inaccurately transcribed and
testified to in court, do not seem applicable to the treatise question, since the material
is in printed form and, unless the printer has erred, we know precisely what the
author has "said."
14. See c. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 296 (1954); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1691 (3d
ed. 1940); Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 455;
Annot., .Medical Books or Treatises as Independent Evidence, 65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930)
84 A.LR. 2d 1338 (1962). Compare Grubb, Proposed "Learned Treatise" Rule, 1946
Wis. L. REv. 81.
15. See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 296, at 621 (1954); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1691, at 5 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Direct Examination of Medical Experts in
Actions for Death and Bodily Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 264, 268 (1952). See also LADD,
CAsES ON EVIDENCE 661 (2d ed. 1955).
16. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 529A (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 63(31)
(1953); 9A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 591, 640 (1965). Uniform Rule § 63(31), adopted
in three jurisdictions, is substantially identical to the older Model Code R. 529A
which has not been adopted in any jurisdiction. See note 4 supra. However, the Model
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urged the adoption of the contrary view. The primary purposes of
confrontation and cross-examination, they point out, is to test the
witness' qualifications, probe the consistency and truth of the testimony presented, and bring out any information not adequately
explored on direct examination. These purposes, it is urged, are
not subverted by permitting medical treatises to be admitted as
direct evidence. As regards the "witness' " qualification, the treatise
may not even be considered unless the work is recognized by the
profession and the court as authoritative. 17 In addition, the author
of such a treatise is subject to the detailed analysis and rebuttal of
his colleagues in professional journals; thus, weaknesses in factual
data or conclusions will be exposed. In this way, learned treatises
are subjected to treatment which serves amply as a substitute for
cross-examination. As to the requirement that a witness be under
oath, other types of hearsay evidence not under oath have been
freely admissible when it could be shown that there was no motive
for, and little danger of, misrepresentation. 18 Here, the scholarly
author is intellectually committed to the search for truth; he has
no motive to conceal or misrepresent for partisan purposes as he
perhaps would on the witness stand. Moreover, the "intellectual
cross-examination" of the scholarly process minimizes the danger
that the treatise evidence will be untrustworthy. The problem of
confusing the jury with the technical language of a medical treatise
is simply met: a local expert might be called to interpret and explain
the meaning and conclusions of the author. This, seemingly, would
be the best of both worlds, since the research, reputation, and conclusions of the author would be made freely available to the factfinder in terms which he could understand. Guarding against the
possibility of an inadequate or slanted interpretation of the work
is, of course, the adversarial system itself. In addition, any reluctance
of medical authorities to testify as to their own conclusions in a
given case might be abated somewhat by requesting them merely
to interpret another's opinion. Furthermore, concern about a "battle
of the books" seems incongruous in the face of the present majority
Code requires only that the "writer" be recognized as authoritative, whereas the
Uniform Rules require that the "writing" itself be so recognized.
17. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 63(31) specifies that as alternate conditions
precedent to admissibility, a court may take judicial notice of the reliability of an
authority or require that an expert in the field testify to the same effect. Alabama's
practice is similar but may not provide for judicial notice. For example, in Smarr v.
State, 260 Ala. 30, 36, 68 S.2d 6, 12 (1953), the court pointed out that treatises are
"not in themselves self-proving, but are admissible only when recognized and approved
by the medical profession as standard."
18. E.g., statements made by a patient to his doctor concerning a presently existing
physical condition are generally admissible, the theory being that the patient has a
certain vested interest in his good health which he probably would not jeopardize by
giving misleading statements to his doctor. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 266 (1954);
6 J. W1GMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1718-23 (3d ed. 1940).
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rule which has led to a "battle of the experts." 19 If competing
theories exist, it may be more desirable that the "battle" take place
on paper rather than in a personal confrontation.
The opinion of the treatise ·writer, developed and recorded in
the detached aerie of academe, is more likely to be presented accurately to the court in ·written form than it would be if the
presentation were made in the emotional atmosphere of litigation.
Cross-examination may be a useful tool in determining the accuracy
of a witness' testimony as to facts, but it may well distort an opinion
based on scholarly research. The objection that the treatise author's
own views may have changed since he ·wrote the book can be
remedied effectively by opposing counsel's alert recognition of this
possibility. Finally, the argument that the work may be merely a
collection of the opinions of others and not based on the personal
observations of the author ignores the fact that all such treatises
must be recognized as authoritative by the profession before the
trial judge can permit its introduction in evidence. In any event,
the treatise is probably no worse than the expert witness himself,
whose opinions are, presumably, at least partially based on what
he learned from his medical school professors, textbooks, and
professional journals.
If these arguments are deemed to rebut the proposition that
medical treatises are an unreliable source of direct evidence, then
an argument can be made for admissibility based on the principle
that all competent evidence, not otherwise excluded, pertaining to
the issue at hand should be made available to and be considered by
the fact-fi.nder. 20 In addition, several more positive arguments can
be made in support of the position prospectively adopted by the
court in the principal case. First, it is less expensive to assemble
books than experts, who may require travel fare, lodging, and meals
in addition to their normal consultation fee. This lower cost benefits
not only the particular litigant, but also broadens the scope of
19. Although earlier writers conceded that there were problems in connection with
the oral testimony of experts at trial, in the main they concluded that it is best "to
let well enough alone." See Foster, Expert Testimon}~Prevalent Complaints and
Proposed Remedies, 11 HARv. L. REv. 169, 185 (1897). See also, Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 403 (1935). However, in light of the growing complexity of personal injury actions as well as easier
accessibility and transportation of experts to court, contemporary writers have recognized that serious distortions to a fair trial may exist. Professor Morgan writes that
"the abuse of expert opinion evidence in modern litigation .•• has become in many
states a scandal, for the expert witness has become in truth an advocate for the party
who presents him, rather than a witness." Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding
Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REv. 725, 733 (1961) reprinted in EssAvs
ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 3, 11 (Roady ed. 1961).
20. As stated in I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 10, at 293 (3d ed. 1940): "The second
axiom on which our law of Evidence rests is this: All facts having rational probative
value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids."
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sources available for consideration by the fact-finder. More important, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain testimony from
a true "expert" if he happens to reside outside the jurisdiction. 21
It may be possible, of course, to obtain a deposition from the learned
author, but this again entails added cost and inconvenience. The
limitations of process and cost, then, may restrict the litigant to
the services of the local expert, who, in certain fields at least, probably knows much of what he does about the subject through the
very ·writings of the expert whose treatise is barred from evidence
by the majority rule. Furthermore, in certain cases, unless the court
admits treatises, there is a difficulty in obtaining any other type of
medical testimony: reluctance and equivocation on the part of
medical witnesses in certain suits often causes hardship for the
plaintiff, who actually may have a meritorious cause of action. 22
Regrettably, except for a brief notation of this last argument,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the principal case did not discuss
any of the conflicting considerations involved on either side of the
question. Yet, although open to criticism for its methods in reaching its conclusion, 23 the court took a bold departure from its prior
precedents in adopting the Alabama rule. Indeed, so that no mistake
could be made as to the scope of its ruling,24 the court pointed to
21. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1691 (3d ed. 1940).
22. In medical malpractice suits it is generally the rule that the plaintiff must
obtain expert medical testimony-another physician-in order to maintain his
burdens of proof as to the proper standard of care for the locality and the defendant's
breach of that standard. If the plaintiff cannot obtain such medical testimony on
his behalf, his cause of action will fail. See, e.g., Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th
Cir. 1964). See generally, 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 62(2) (1951).
23. It would appear that the court, while enunciating a sound rule of law, misread or misunderstood the state of existing precedent, for it stated that: "(w]hcrc
the foundation is laid that the work is authoritative, recognized by the medical profession, and one which has influence on medical opinions, such works have now been
admitted as independent evidence." Principal case at 509 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the only authority for this proposition cited by the court, 2 B. JONES, EVIDENCC
§ 421 (Supp. 1964), indicates that: "[u]pon the direct examination of an c.xpert
witness on medical science, extracts from treatises in that science which he states arc
recognized by his profession as authoritative and which have influenced or tended to
confirm his opinion may be used." [Citing Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 146
Conn. 327, 150 A.2d 602 (1959).] (Emphasis added.) To say that a treatise may be used
on direct examination is not the equivalent of saying that it has now been admitted
as independent evidence. In fact, Kaplan did not permit the introduction of medical
treatises as independent evidence, but merely said that where there is a proper showing that the treatise is a "recognized authority," counsel could use it in direct examination of his expert witness and read from it during the course of his closing argument.
See note 6 supra. Furthermore, a glance at the topic heading in the Jones text reveals
that the statement cited pertains to cross-examination of an expert witness, whereas
the inadmissibility of treatises as "independent evidence" is postulated at 3 B. JONES,
EVIDENCE § 621 (5th ed. 1958).
24. One aspect of the case in particular detracts from its appropriateness as a leading precedent for the admissibility of medical treatises. Strictly speaking, the Guide
here involved is not a treatise, but rather a committee-compiled pamphlet in the
nature of a standard of measurement, a category more susceptible of admissibility than
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and specifically adopted Rule 63(31) of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence,:m which unequivocally permits introduction of treatises
as direct, substantive evidence. In view of the reliability and trustworthiness of such treatises and the practical problems of obtaining
qualified expert witnesses, the admission of such writings is not out
of line with the policies behind allowing exceptions to the hearsay rule.
As in so many areas of the law, the question eventually comes
down to a balancing of opposing interests-here, the justifiable
suspicion of the reliability and trustworthiness of out-of-court statements must be balanced against the desirability or necessity of
having the most complete, competent evidence available before
the fact-finder. While the value of cross-examination in open court
as an instrument of ferreting out the truth and insuring reliability
should not be understated, it seems that suspicions should be eased
by taking into account the painstaking approach of the scholarly
process. In any event, it is not entirely helpful to lump a carefully
·written treatise in the same category as that of the eavesdropper
or even that of the ordinary publication. In addition, it may still
be noted that a considerable need exists for this sort of evidence.
Supplementing the arguments already mentioned, 26 is that plain
fact that treatise evidence will often help the fact-finder to give
due weight to expert testimony. Admittedly, even where a medical
treatise is ·written in terms susceptible of comprehension by the
jury, it seems unlikely that counsel would not seek to buttress
his case with a live expert to tie the conclusions of the text to the
specific facts at hand. Yet the mere presence of treatises, especially
when they are in agreement, seems to make the standards used more
objective and less likely to sway to the rhythms of litigation. In fact,
it may be argued that those courts espousing the more liberal crossexamination rules, including the United States Supreme Court,27
must implicitly recognize that authoritative treatises have value as
something more than merely a test for qualification or impeachment
treatises. See, e.g., Mccomish v. De Soi, 42 N.J. 274, 282, 200 A.2d 116, 120-21 (1964).
Another limiting factor is that the issue in the principal case arose in a cross-examination setting, not on direct examination.
25. Principal case at 509. This approach of using a Uniform Rule as a source of
common law may hold implications for the future of the Uniform Rules. While it
was the intent of the drafters that the Rules should be adopted as a unified whole
[see Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 503 (1965)], it
may be that such piecemeal incorporation by reference will facilitate future adoption
of the whole. See generally Orfield, Can Rules of Evidence Be Codified?, 42 N.D.L.
REv. 13 (1965); Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DICK. L. REv. 381
(1963); Swearingen, How the Adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence Woulcl
Af]ect the Law of Evidence in Oregon: Rules 62-66, 42 ORE. L. REv. 200 (1963).
26. See text accompanying notes 21 &: 22, supra.
27. See note IO supra.
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of the witness: when examination is permitted with the use of a
treatise which was not specifically relied upon by the witness, the
result, in effect, is to pit one authority against the other on almost
equal terms. In reality, since it seems likely that a jury does not
precisely fathom the distinction between introduction for impeachment purposes and introduction for substantive purposes, it is but
a "short evolutionary step"28 from the liberal cross-examination
rules to the rule adopted in the principal case.
28. See Swearingen, supra note 25, at 246.

